The EU's New Global Strategy: Its Implementation in a Troubled International Environment by Buitelaar, T. et al.
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
THE EU’S NEW GLOBAL STRATEGY: 
ITS IMPLEMENTATION IN A TROUBLED 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
 
November 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Funded by the    
 
 
   
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This report was prepared by: 
 Mr. Tom Buitelaar, Researcher, The Hague Institute for Global Justice, and PhD Candidate, 
European University Institute (EUI) (t.buitelaar@TheHagueInstitute.org) 
 Dr. Joris Larik, Senior Researcher, The Hague Institute for Global Justice, and Assistant 
Professor, Leiden University (j.larik@TheHagueInstitute.org) 
 Dr. Aaron Matta, Senior Researcher, The Hague Institute for Global Justice 
(a.matta@TheHagueInstitute.org) 
 Mr. Bart de Vos, Research Intern, The Hague Institute for Global Justice 
(b.devos@thehagueinstitute.org) 
 
 
 
 
 
Contents 
Executive Summary ................................................................................................................................. 1 
1. Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 2 
2. Shaping the Global Strategy................................................................................................................ 3 
2.1 Values, interests and a rules-based global order .......................................................................... 3 
2.2 Enhancing the EU’s capacity to deliver ......................................................................................... 4 
2.3 The EU’s engagement with old and new partners ........................................................................ 5 
3. Next Steps: Opportunities and Challenges for Implementation .......................................................... 7 
3.1 The Global Strategy: Its Relevance in a Troubled International Environment .............................. 7 
3.2 Strengthening the EU as a security actor ...................................................................................... 9 
3.3 Strengthening rules-based global governance (in the case of cyber) ......................................... 11 
3.4 Strengthening the EU’s ‘joined-up’ approach in the implementation of the SDGs ...................... 13 
4. Conclusion and Recommendations ................................................................................................... 15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Disclaimers  
This document has been prepared for the European Commission. However, it reflects the views only 
of the authors, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the 
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Institute for Global Justice or any other institution. The document is based on an event on the 
implementation of the EU’s Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy, which was held on 30 
September 2016 and jointly organized by The Hague Institute for Global Justice and the 
Representation of the European Commission and the European Parliament Information Office in the 
Netherlands. All contributions on which this document may draw were made exclusively in a personal 
capacity and under the Chatham House Rule. 
About The Hague Institute for Global Justice 
The Hague Institute is an independent, nonpartisan organization established to conduct 
interdisciplinary policy-relevant research, develop practitioner tools, and convene experts, 
practitioners, and policymakers to facilitate knowledge sharing. Located in the city that has been a 
symbol of peace and justice for over a century, The Hague Institute is positioned uniquely to address 
issues at the intersection of peace, security and justice. 
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Executive Summary 
In June 2016, High Representative Mogherini presented the EU’s new Global Strategy on Foreign and 
Security Policy (EUGS) to the European Council. With the Strategy now finalized, attention needs to 
turn to its implementation in an environment mired by crises both within Europe and the wider world. In 
September 2016, The Hague Institute for Global Justice and Europe House—the European 
Parliament Information Office and the Representation of the European Commission in The 
Netherlands—organized an expert meeting and a public panel discussion, which inform the present 
document as a first appraisal of the Global Strategy. Focusing on three areas of particular salience in 
EU foreign policy—the EU as a security actor, developing rules-based global governance in new 
areas, and the ‘joined-up’ approach in pursuing the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)—
the following recommendations for the implementation of the EUGS can be made: 
The EU as a security actor 
The EU needs a pragmatic and flexible approach in order to solve the crises around Europe and to 
improve its credibility in the short and long term, for example by using ad hoc coalitions. Moreover, a 
possible withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU could open up political space for deepened 
defense cooperation. The EU would need to find ways to make use of this political space in order to 
generate political will in the capitals for deepening defense cooperation. More broadly speaking, the 
EU should devise plans to connect with its citizens as a security actor and communicate the message 
that EU defense cooperation tangibly benefits the security of all citizens. 
Developing rules-based global governance 
Using the area of cyber governance as an example given its cross-cutting importance, the EU should 
fully embrace the role of ‘agenda-shaper, connector, coordinator and facilitator within a networked web 
of players’ by investing in multistakeholder initiatives and, together with the Member States, showing 
coordinated political leadership in this area. The EU, furthermore, needs to take its internal normative 
innovations (such as the “right to be forgotten”) to the global stage, where they can serve as 
inspiration to other actors. It should also use regional approaches and coalitions of like-minded 
countries as building blocks for working towards a global consensus. In addition, the EU should bolster 
its credibility as a cyber power by capacity-building, both within the EU Member States and third 
countries, to fight criminal activities and strengthen cooperation between law enforcement agencies. 
Capacity-building as part of a ‘joined-up approach’ in the case of the SDGs 
For SDGs to be progressively realized through ‘joined-up’ EU action, they need to be translated and 
concretized into measurable goals, which should be pursued through already existing policies and 
strategies and be taken into account during the framing of new ones. Moreover, the EU should invest, 
in tandem with the Member States, in communicating to the public that the SDGs are a global 
commitment with implications, both positive and negative, in the daily lives of citizens. For the EU, the 
most important next step is to translate the EUGS into prioritized and coherent sub-strategies with a 
view to maintaining the SDGs as a central element of the follow-up of the EUGS. 
The Global Strategy will remain the core guidance for EU external action for years to come. However, 
the period until the first yearly progress report in June 2017 will be crucial for establishing the traction 
and first concrete results produced by the Strategy. As the calendars of the EU institutions and 
Member State policymakers are filling up with more milestones for its implementation, existing sector-
specific strategies will be updated and new ones developed. Implementing the Global Strategy will be 
a momentous endeavor by any standard, both for the EU and its Member States. How well they will 
work together, use their resources, build political momentum and voice their common message will 
ultimately determine the role of the EU in the world.  
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1. Introduction 
In June 2015, the European Council asked the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, to draft, in cooperation with the Member States an 
overarching strategy for the EU’s foreign and security policy. One year later, on June 28, 2016, High 
Representative Mogherini presented the European Union Global Strategy for Foreign and Security 
Policy (EUGS), entitled “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe,”
1
 to EU leaders. The 
Strategy sets out the agenda for EU foreign policy and serves as a document which expresses the 
Union’s shared vision for common action. Subsequently, the European Council noted in its 
Conclusions that it “welcomes the presentation of the Global Strategy [...] and invites the High 
Representative, the Commission and the Council to take the work forward.”
2
 In this spirit, the 
Conclusions of the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council of October 2016 stressed that the “political vision set 
out in the EUGS will be swiftly translated into concrete policy.”
3
 With the Strategy now finalized, 
attention is turning to its implementation in an environment mired by crises both within Europe and the 
world at large. First steps in this direction have been outlined already in the area of security and 
defense, as defined in November 2016.
4
 As momentum in this area needs to be maintained and other 
areas are yet to catch up, the period until the first yearly progress report in June 2017 will be crucial for 
establishing the traction and concrete results produced by the Global Strategy. 
The new Strategy is the result of a year-long process during which the High Representative consulted 
with EU institutions, Member States, experts, civil society representatives, and other stakeholders. The 
Hague Institute for Global Justice and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands organized a 
closed expert consultation and a public panel on December 8 and 9, 2015 to inform the Dutch input 
statement in the strategic review process. Following the event, The Hague Institute presented its 
report “Expert Consultation in the Framework of the EU Strategic Review Process,” which summarized 
the main findings of the expert consultation, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands.
5
 
The EUGS sets priorities and objectives, and identifies the EU’s means to achieve them. However, the 
new Strategy comes in a time of growing uncertainty and insecurity in Europe and beyond. With the 
Brexit referendum, the migration crisis, the unabating war in Syria, terrorist attacks in and outside the 
EU, and the “arc of instability”
6
 around Europe, the Strategy has to take into account a heavily troubled 
international environment. The question, therefore, is whether this document will serve as a lodestar in 
                                                     
1
 A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, “Shared Vision, Common Action: A 
Stronger Europe”, June 2016, https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/eugs_review_web.pdf 
(hereinafter: EUGS). 
2
 European Council Conclusions, EUCO 26/16, Brussels, 28 June 2016, pt. 20. 
3
 Council Conclusions on the Global Strategy on the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, Luxembourg, 
17 October 2016, 13202/16, pt. 3. 
4
 Council conclusions on implementing the EU Global Strategy in the area of Security and Defence, Brussels, 14 
November 2016, 14149/16; and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Vice-
President of the European Commission, and Head of the European Defense Agency, Implementation Plan on 
Security and Defence, Brussels, 14 November 2016, 14392/16. 
5
 Subsequently, this document was made available on the website the EU dedicated to the Global Strategy. See 
Tom Buitelaar, Joris Larik and Aaron Matta, The EU’s Contribution to Common Global Rules: Challenges in an 
Age of Power Shifts: Summary of Findings of the Expert Consultation in the Framework of the EU Strategic 
Review Process, The Hague Institute for Global Justice, December 2015, 
https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/file/137/download?token=FOJ1XQyl. 
6
 Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Bert Koenders, “Koenders to strengthen diplomacy efforts in response to 
instability on Europe’s borders,” 11 September 2015, 
https://www.government.nl/latest/news/2015/09/11/koenders-to-strengthen-diplomacy-efforts-in-response-to-
instability-on-europe-s-borders.  
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stormy waters, or whether it will end up in a desk drawer, having failed to make its mark in this critical 
time. 
On September 30, 2016, The Hague Institute and Europe House – the European Parliament 
Information Office and the Representation of the European Commission in The Netherlands – 
organized an event to offer a first appraisal of the EUGS and outline the way forward in terms of its 
implementation in a number of select areas. The event consisted of two elements: a closed expert 
meeting and a public panel discussion. The expert meeting brought together specialists from 
diplomacy, academia, and civil society, to assess the content and outlook of the EUGS and to discuss 
its future implementation, including from the particular perspective of the Netherlands. The specialists 
met in three breakout sessions to focus on the following topics: the EU as a security actor, developing 
rules-based global governance in new areas, and capacity-building as part of the ‘joined-up’ approach
7
 
with regard to the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The public panel took a wider 
perspective, reflecting on the relevance of the EUGS in the current geopolitical context. 
This report has two main parts – one looking back and one looking forward. Firstly, it evaluates to 
which extent the suggestions coming out of the December 2015 expert meeting are reflected in the 
final EUGS document. Secondly, it highlights opportunities and challenges for the implementation of 
the EUGS. This section will be structured in line with the three topics that were addressed during the 
event on September 30, 2016: strengthening the EU as a security actor, developing rules-based 
global governance, and capacity-building as part of the ‘joined-up’ approach. The conclusion 
summarizes the main findings and provides an overview of the next steps for the implementation of 
the Global Strategy. 
2. Shaping the Global Strategy 
Before turning to challenges and opportunities of implementation, a brief appraisal of the content of 
the Global Strategy is warranted. The document is the result of a year-long process of consultation 
with institutions and stakeholders which are now called upon to facilitate turning its aspirations into 
reality. To this end, this section evaluates how the content of the EUGS relates to the proposals made 
at the Expert Consultation in the Framework of the EU Strategic Review Process at The Hague 
Institute, compiled in a report published in December 2015, and identifies where the consultation’s 
Summary of Findings and the EUGS dovetail.
8
  
2.1 Values, interests and a rules-based global order 
The Strategy sets out a foreign policy based on “principled pragmatism,” through which the EU will 
approach the world “as much from a realistic assessment of the strategic environment as from an 
idealistic aspiration to advance a better world.”
9
 This approach has generated much discussion in 
appraisals of the EUGS.
10
 It means that the Strategy recognizes the potential tensions between 
                                                     
7
 In our definition, a joined-up approach can be understood as interagency (inter-institutional), cross- sectoral 
cooperation in internal and external EU policies where the EU is working to close gaps and avoid overlaps in 
development cooperation, security and other domains. 
8
 As a disclaimer, this analysis does not claim causality. Instead, it seeks to trace the translation of certain ideas 
from the December consultation – not to the exclusion of similar events held elsewhere – and to identify areas of 
input that reverberated within the Dutch foreign policy community and the European External Action Service 
(EEAS), and that were ultimately reflected in the Strategy. 
9
 EUGS, p. 16.  
10
 For some of these discussions see, e.g., Sven Biscop, The EU Global Strategy: Realpolitik with European 
Characteristics, EGMONT Security Policy Brief No. 75 (June 2016); Giovanni Grevi, A Global Strategy for a soul-
searching European Union, EPC Discussion Paper, 13 July 2016; and Stefan Lehne, The EU Global Strategy, a 
 
 
 
4 
interests and values. Nevertheless, achieving a balance between the two is a notoriously difficult issue 
and how this ‘principle’ will work out in practice remains to be seen. In its surrounding regions, the 
EUGS makes the promotion of human rights an important pillar of its approach, simultaneously 
arguing for “tailor-made policies” to achieve this and other goals.
11
 This is laid out in more detail in its 
treatment of the relationship with China and Asia, where the support for human rights is mentioned 
several times.
12
 
In this context, the experts convened in December 2015 noted that if the EU wants to promote a rules-
based global order, it could not be overly assertive. Instead, it should point to the fact that these 
values are underpinned by international law and universally accepted norms, and start with keeping a 
clean house so that it can be credible in its rule-promotion.
13
 The EUGS endorses this view by setting 
out clearly the principles which will guide the Union in its foreign policy, namely unity, engagement, 
responsibility and partnership.
14
 Moreover, the Strategy emphasizes the EU’s commitment to a rules-
based global order, the principle of multilateralism and the UN as the most important international 
organization.
15
 In addition, the EUGS notes that European security and defense will be developed 
further in “full compliance with international law.”
16
 The EUGS also recognizes that it is necessary that 
the EU follows its ‘own’ norms and rules and maintains a strong rule of law to be ‘credible’ to the 
outside world.  
2.2 Enhancing the EU’s capacity to deliver 
Despite the regular misgivings about the value of multilateralism, the participants at the December 
2015 expert consultation recommended that the Strategy would “make clear that the EU has a stake in 
the international rules-based system.”
17
 In this context, the Strategy states that “[t]he EU will promote a 
rules-based global order with multilateralism as its key principle and the United Nations at its core.”
18
 
This order, it goes on, should be “grounded in international law, including the principles of the UN 
Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”
19
 It makes clear that the countries in the 
Union cannot face the world alone and that they need to be unified in making this world a more 
“peaceful, fair and prosperous” one.
20
  
Importantly, during the consultation, non-European experts emphasized that those outside the EU will 
see the Strategy as a clear signal to the rest of the world: it matters what the EU says and does.
21
 At 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
Triumph of Hope Over Experience, Carnegie Europe, 4 July 2016, 
http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=64003. 
11
 EUGS, pp. 25-26. 
12
 Ibid., p. 37.  
13
 Buitelaar, Larik and Matta, Summary of Findings, pp. 4-5.  
14
 EUGS, pp. 16-18. The Summary of Findings recommended that the EUGS reiterate the Lisbon Treaty’s values 
(p. 5). It is therefore notable that these values differ from the values set out by the Lisbon Treaty (which are 
respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including 
the rights of persons belonging to minorities), though it must be noted that these concepts permeate the 
document.  
15
 Ibid., p. 15. 
16
 Ibid., p. 30. 
17
 Buitelaar, Larik and Matta, Summary of Findings, p. 4.  
18
 EUGS, p. 15.  
19
 Ibid., p. 15. 
20
 Ibid., pp. 15-16. 
21
 Buitelaar, Larik and Matta, Summary of Findings, p. 5. 
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the same time, the experts noted that the EU has to pay attention to the ‘expectations-credibility gap’, 
i.e. it should not set expectations that the EU cannot deliver upon.
22
 It is therefore noteworthy that the 
Global Strategy includes a paragraph on strategic communication—noting that the EU will enhance its 
public diplomacy to “connect EU foreign policy with citizens and better communicate it to our 
partners”
23
—while simultaneously remaining humble in the expectations it is setting.
24
  
2.3 The EU’s engagement with old and new partners 
Regional developments and forms of governance are increasingly important for foreign policy. The EU 
is often seen—and tends to portray itself—as a possible model for the peaceful and effective 
organization of a region into a bloc.
25
 To some extent, the experts at the December 2015 consultation 
supported inter-regional cooperation, recommending that the EU supports regional organizations as 
long as they respect core international norms and contribute to the maintenance or development of 
global public goods. Such improved inter-regional cooperation can, in turn, “act as stepping-stone to 
an improved rules-based multilateral system.”
26
 To a large extent, the EUGS echoes this assessment, 
stating that the Union “will not strive to export [its] model, but rather seek reciprocal inspiration from 
different regional experiences.”
27
  
In the context of partnerships, one could argue that the shifting global order necessitates a more 
flexible approach towards partnering and coalition building. Experts at the consultation argued that, to 
“defend, promote and develop further jointly owned norms and values,” the EU “should cooperate with 
other organizations, emerging powers and ‘non-Western-led’ forms of governance.”
28
 
Firstly, this concerns the reform of the architecture and functioning of the UN and global rule of law 
and justice institutions. The system of global governance is often seen to be outdated and in need of 
reform.
29
 One of the primary recommendations of the experts in this respect was to approach each 
organization on its own merits, maintain the principle of “effectiveness, transparency, inclusiveness, 
flexibility, and accountability” while remaining “sensitive to the context, and taking into account the role 
of the EU and its Member States within these organizations.”
30
  
In this spirit the EUGS states a commitment to reform the UN, to make it stronger and more fit for the 
21
st
 century, to maintain it as “the bedrock of the multilateral rules-based order.”
31
 It puts forward the 
principles of “accountability, representativeness, responsibility, effectiveness and transparency” as the 
guide to reforming UN institutions, which will all require a different approach determined on a case-by-
                                                     
22
 The concept was coined as early as 1993, see Christopher Hill, “The Capability-Expectations Gap, or 
Conceptualising Europe’s International Role” (1993) 31 Journal of Common Market Studies 305. 
23
 EUGS, p. 23. 
24
 This was also noted by other commentators. See, for example: Kristina Kausch, The EU Global Strategy in the 
Shadow of Brexit, Carnegie Europe, 7 July 2016, http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=64034. 
25
 Some have instead argued that is unlikely that the EU can be replicated elsewhere and that it is unwise to try to 
do so as the EU was the result of unique historical developments, which are unlikely to arise in other states. See, 
for example Stephen Krasner on Sovereignty, Failed States and International Regimes, Theory Talks, 19 October 
2008, http://www.theory-talks.org/2008/10/theory-talk-21.html. 
26
 Buitelaar, Larik and Matta, Summary of Findings, p. 6. 
27
 EUGS, p. 32.  
28
 Buitelaar, Larik and Matta, Summary of Findings, p. 3. At the expert consultation, the term “non-Western-led” 
was also criticized by some as potentially “patronizing, as if the EU were in a ‘privileged’ position in which it can 
choose to allow non-Western led approaches to flourish” (p. 7).  
29
 See William Durch, Joris Larik and Richard Ponzio, “Just Security and the Crisis of Global Governance,” 
Survival 58, no. 4 (2016), 95-112. 
30
 Buitelaar, Larik and Matta, Summary of Findings, p. 5.  
31
 EUGS, p. 39.  
 
 
 
6 
case basis. The EUGS additionally maintains the wish to strengthen the voice of the EU “across 
multilateral fora” although it does not detail how it seeks to do so.
32
  
Secondly, global engagement also entails the development of new partnerships with non-state actors 
to address non-traditional challenges and tackle emerging threats. In December 2015 experts argued 
for enhanced support for different types of governance “as long as they respect core international 
norms (including human rights) and as long as they furnish contributions to global public goods.”
33
 
They also recommended to remain pragmatic and to work through tailor-made coalitions for specific 
problems.
34
 For this purpose, they argued, it is important to “acknowledge the existence of a degree of 
normative pluralism,” while maintaining the need for collective action based on shared principles.
35
 
This acknowledgment is absent in the Strategy. However, the EUGS does note that the EU will 
“partner selectively with players whose cooperation is necessary to deliver global public goods and 
address common challenges” and that it will reach out more to civil society and the private sector.
36
  
The December 2015 consultation, furthermore, featured discussions on the role and place of civil 
society in the foreign policy of the Union. Experts noted the importance of supporting a vibrant civil 
society as a primary interest of the EU and that, consequently, the EU should take a clear stand 
against the oppression of civil society in other countries. At the same time, they also cautioned against 
patronizing language or appearances of instrumentalizing civil society for the purposes of the EU.
37
 It 
is therefore encouraging that the EUGS speaks of civil society as key partners multiple times and 
promises long-term support for civil society, vowing to “speak out against the shrinking space for civil 
society.”
38
 
While new challenges require new partners, they also require new approaches and the courage to 
challenge the status quo and develop new norms for global governance. The experts noted the added 
value of the EU as a “connector and coordinator,” recommending that it should use this role to 
“contribute to the development of rules for areas where these were either non-existent or 
underdeveloped (such as cyber, outer space, energy, etc.).”
39
 The EUGS endorses this idea and 
states that the Union will not only uphold international law as it currently stands, but also be proactive 
in developing rules “[a]t the frontiers of global affairs.” Echoing the calls from the 2015 expert 
consultation, the EUGS attempts to carve out a role for the EU in developing global norms in the areas 
of, amongst others, cyber, space, energy, and health.
40
 It sees its role as to “promote exchanges with 
relevant multilateral fora to help spearhead the development of rules and build partnerships at the 
frontiers of global affairs.”
41
 It sees its role as “an agenda-shaper, a connector, coordinator and 
facilitator within a networked web of players.”
42
 This is language which seems to build upon the 
discussions at the December 2015 expert consultation. 
 
                                                     
32
 Ibid., pp. 39-40.  
33
 Buitelaar, Larik and Matta, Summary of Findings, p. 6.  
34
 Ibid., p. 7. 
35
 Ibid., p. 6. 
36
 EUGS, p. 18. 
37
 Buitelaar, Larik and Matta, Summary of Findings, p. 3.  
38
 EUGS, p. 27. 
39
 Buitelaar, Larik and Matta, Summary of Findings, p. 2.  
40
 EUGS, pp. 42-43. 
41
 Ibid., p. 43. 
42
 Ibid.  
 
 
 
7 
3. Next Steps: Opportunities and Challenges for 
Implementation  
With the EUGS having been finalized and presented to the European Council, attention now shifts 
from its content to its implementation in a troubled international environment. This was the focus of the 
event of 30 September, 2016, which featured a public panel debate on the overall appraisal of the 
Global Strategy and the current geopolitical climate (3.1), as well as three closed expert discussions 
which respectively focused on: the EU as a security actor (3.2), developing rules-based global 
governance in new areas (3.3), and capacity-building as part of the ‘joined-up’ approach in the case of 
pursuing the UN’s SDGs (3.4).
43
 The following pages will summarize these debates and elaborate on 
the main findings with regard to each focus area. 
3.1 The Global Strategy: Its Relevance in a Troubled International 
Environment 
The topics discussed in both the plenary discussion and the public panel focused on the following 
issues: security and defense with relation to capabilities and operations; civil society engagement and 
the concept of ‘resilience’; the Strategy’s emphasis on ‘responsive Union’ and the ‘joined-up 
approach’; the tension between development and security; and the notion of ‘principled pragmatism’. 
The public panel was opened by Dr. Abi Williams (President of The Hague Institute for Global Justice) 
and Ms. Maria Silvia Gatta (Head of the political department of the Representation of the European 
Commission in The Netherlands). Ms. Gatta highlighted in her remarks the rationale of the event, i.e. 
the need to create awareness, support and ownership for the Global Strategy and for the role of the 
EU as a global actor. In addition to Mr. Conte and Ms. Karimi, Ms. Lise Gregoire-van Haaren (Head of 
the Political Affairs Unit at the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and Prof. Dr. Joris Voorhoeve (The 
Hague University of Applied Sciences, Leiden University and former Defense Minister of The 
Netherlands) provided their insights to the public.   
Mr. Conte highlighted the main ideas behind the EUGS, one of which is the importance of partnerships 
in effectively addressing the challenges the Union is currently facing. Additionally, Mr. Conte argued 
that commitment from the Member States is critical to make the EUGS a success, as foreign policy 
begins in the EU Member States, not in Brussels. Finally, the importance of outreach and reconnecting 
with the public was stressed as foreign policy concerns everyone. 
Ms. Gregoire-van Haaren focused on the perspective of the Netherlands on the EUGS. She stated 
that citizens and their interests are at the core of both Dutch foreign policy and the Dutch priorities for 
the EUGS. The Dutch government wants to uphold its ‘social contract’ with its citizens in a dynamic 
world. Ms. Gregoire-van Haaren continued that, in a globalized world, the Member States of the 
European Union will have increasing difficulties in upholding the ‘social contract’ alone – hence the 
need for cooperation to provide security and bring prosperity for their citizens in a more connected, 
contested and complex world. 
Following these statements, the panel discussed the aforementioned themes. On security and 
defense, Prof. Voorhoeve stressed that nothing can succeed without leadership, including from the 
                                                     
43
 The joined-up approach in the Global Strategy is defined as to mainstream external and internal policies 
between Member States and EU institutions, and between the internal and external dimensions of our policies, 
EUGS, pp. 49-51. 
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larger EU Member States such as Germany. He noted that there is currently a lack of political will to 
effectively deal with the current security challenges that surround Europe. This is problematic and has 
fed into the growing sense of anti-internationalism. Prof. Voorhoeve continued to describe European 
integration as one of the most positive developments in the history of international politics, but added 
that it has lost its glamour. The EU, therefore, should show concrete results to generate popular 
support for international cooperation. These results can be achieved by creating ad hoc coalitions of 
willing states to tackle urgent problems around Europe. Principled pragmatism, therefore, seems to be 
the right mentality for the Union to move forward. 
There was also concern regarding the emphasis on security and defense in the EUGS. Ms. Karimi 
cautioned that ‘hard security’ interests should not triumph over other important issues like the SDGs. 
Ms. Karimi then turned to issues of civil society engagement and the concept of ‘resilience.’ On the 
role of NGOs, while she stressed the need for cooperation, she observed at the same time that it is 
vitally important to be able to explain, communicate and have the support of the people for the EUGS. 
At the moment, she argues, the EU is perceived negatively by EU citizens. Therefore, Ms. Karimi’s 
main question was whether the EU citizens expect such an ambitious strategy. She agrees with Prof. 
Voorhoeve that there is a lack of political will within the EU to deliver the necessary actions, for 
example with regard to the SDGs. 
On the issues of a ‘joined-up approach’ and the potential tensions between development and security, 
one common issue that was voiced during the discussions was that the EUGS rejects a narrow 
understanding of the EU’s security. The Strategy notes that “[f]ragility beyond our borders threatens all 
our vital interests. By contrast, resilience […] benefits us and countries in our surrounding regions.”
44
 
To this end, the ‘joined-up’ approach as set out in the EUGS is expected to make more resources 
available to strengthen capacity-building, intended as a means to build more resilient societies and 
states and to contribute to the realization of the SDGs, thereby helping to prevent conflict. This new 
approach further aligns the security and development objectives of the external action of the European 
Union, and is expected to contribute to more peaceful and cooperative neighbors and regional orders. 
This broad all-inclusive approach includes attempts to ease any tensions between development on the 
one hand and security and defense on the other. 
On the topic of a ‘responsive union,’ Mr. Conte stated that one of the main challenges Europe faces is 
the erosion of unity. He argued that the EU wants to strike a balance between preserving unity and 
guaranteeing flexibility. Mr. Conte argued that unity should not become a straightjacket: “We need an 
ambitious agenda. We need a realistic agenda.” Striking the right balance between unity and flexibility 
prevents divisions within the EU. 
Despite such lively debates, many questions regarding the Strategy remain. The Strategy states that 
“EU foreign policy is not a solo performance: it is an orchestra which plays from the same score.”
45
 To 
stay within this metaphor: Who is the conductor and who are the backing vocals? Nonetheless, clear 
recommendations for implementation were voiced: showing clear results to gain public support for the 
EU and its external policies, the importance of outreach and connecting with citizens, and the idea that 
security should not come at the cost of other important goals like the SDGs. 
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3.2 Strengthening the EU as a security actor 
In the words of the Global Strategy, an “appropriate level of ambition and strategic autonomy is 
important for Europe´s ability to foster peace and safeguard security within and beyond its borders.”
46
 
The EU’s involvement in fragile and conflict-torn states has increased in recent years
47
; from troop 
training and security sector reform activities in EUSEC RD Congo and countering anti-terrorism and 
organized crime in EUCAP Sahel Niger, to border management with a capacity-building mandate in 
EUBAM Libya. Furthermore, adaptations to the EU’s common security capabilities and organizational 
frameworks are proposed in the EUGS, ranging from reinforced EDA benchmarking to further 
extending the mandates and ambition of EU military and civilian operations. This ambition is also 
reflected in the Global Strategy, with the first priority solely focusing on security of the Union.
48
 This 
first priority on “strengthening security and defence” was reiterated in the conclusions of the EU’s 
Foreign Affairs Council of 17 October 2016.
49
 This ambition was developed further in the 
Implementation Plan on Security and Defence, presented by High Representative Mogherini during 
the Council of 14 November 2016. The plan, which also includes concrete actions, was subsequently 
welcomed by the Council and will be discussed by EU’s Heads of State and Government in 
December.
50
 The first breakout session of the closed expert consultation discussed the ambitious 
plans of the EUGS and the possible obstacles and opportunities for their implementation. 
The experts began by outlining several challenges. Firstly, experts discussed the state of the 
European security architecture and that of the EU. According to the experts, the security architecture, 
built over the last 25 years, is not only deteriorating but also falling apart. There are several current 
issues that need be addressed: the US presidential elections and the possible consequences for 
NATO, uncertainty about a resurgent Russia, the Syrian conflict, the so-called ‘Islamic State,’ the fear 
of terrorist attacks, and the political situation in Turkey and Libya. On top of that, the EU as a project 
has lost its glamour and there is increasing uncertainty within the EU.  
Secondly, the experts discussed Brexit and its implications. Expectations were that the United 
Kingdom would continue to play a role in European defense and security as it is in its interest to stay 
close to Europe. Moreover, the United Kingdom is a NATO member. The experts noted that the British 
departure from the Union would have both negative and positive effects. The negative effect would be 
that the biggest military spender would leave the EU—roughly 25% of the total EU defense 
expenditure.
51
 Additionally, one of the more decisive and willing members on defense and security 
issues would leave the Union. Over the past years, London has displayed great willingness to act in 
crisis situations. A British withdrawal from the EU raises questions of who will step up and take on this 
role. At the same time, a Brexit could result in opening of political space. However, further defense 
cooperation can also backfire with the European citizens. Overall, the general consensus was that a 
pragmatic arrangement with London could be struck, for example a sort of associate membership on 
defense issues, similar to arrangements in the former Western European Union (WEU, 1954-2011).  
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Thirdly, experts felt that the Global Strategy lacked vision and was technocratic. In addition, experts 
underscored the EU’s credibility issue. All participants agreed that admitting this problem would be 
positive. Many experts argued that a stronger need for defense and security could have been voiced 
in the Strategy. The Strategy was the opportunity to present a deep strategic vision and give a fair 
strategic assessment of European security and Europe’s geopolitical position. This assessment could 
be included in action plans following the Strategy. 
Following the discussion on the many challenges facing Europe, the many opportunities for the Union 
were also discussed. Firstly, pragmatic solutions were put forward as means to solve urgent crises 
and as a way to build credibility. The notion of ‘principled pragmatism’
52
 was therefore welcomed by 
the experts. The experts concluded that there are sufficient institutional mechanisms and policies, 
such as article 42 of the Lisbon Treaty, together with the other provisions on the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). These mechanisms and 
policies would provide sufficient possibilities for cooperation within the EU framework. There is 
therefore no need for new institutional mechanisms. Moreover, there is no lack of capacity within the 
EU, but, rather, a lack of political will. Political leadership in the capitals is needed if the goals in the 
Strategy are ever to be achieved. 
Secondly, the importance attached in the Global Strategy to NATO and EU-NATO cooperation was 
discussed. The experts welcomed this idea and stated that there was room for more cooperation 
between the EU and NATO, and even with non-EU and non-NATO members. Ad hoc coalitions were 
mentioned as a serious option to address current urgent crises as well as build credibility. 
Alternatively, more structured formats or mechanisms were also considered. One example of a 
successful cooperation mechanism between the EU, NATO, non-EU and non-NATO countries is the 
“Shared Awareness and Deconfliction” mechanism (SHADE), that was created during the military 
counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and the western Indian Ocean. Since 2015, SHADE 
meetings have also taken place for the Mediterranean Sea. SHADE could therefore be considered a 
‘best practice’.  
Thirdly, suggestions for private-public defense cooperation were put forward to address future 
challenges. It was argued this was much needed since states cannot deal with the complex nature of 
contemporary and future challenges. An example for this is the field of cyber security. The EU could 
function as a conduit for cooperation between multiple traditional, Member States-based, and non-
traditional actors of a non-state nature. 
In conclusion, five main recommendations follow from the discussion in session A. Firstly, define ways 
to improve the EU’s credibility in the short and long term and be pragmatic and flexible in dealing with 
urgent crises around Europe. Secondly, explore the political space for defense cooperation in view of 
a potential Brexit. Thirdly, come up with ideas for pragmatic arrangements with London. Fourthly, 
devise strategies to connect with citizens and communicate the message that defense cooperation 
benefits the security of all citizens. Lastly, devise plans to fully use the institutional mechanisms and 
policies already in place. As can be seen from the Council Conclusions of 14 November 2016, most if 
not all of these recommendations are being taken forward, though concrete progress will become 
visible only in the first half of 2017 based on further proposals and their follow-up by the High 
Representative, the Commission and others. 
  
                                                     
52
 EUGS, p.8. 
 
 
 
11 
3.3 Strengthening rules-based global governance (in the case of cyber) 
The Global Strategy emphasizes the EU’s commitment “to a global order based on international law, 
including the principles of the UN Charter” and notes that this “commitment translates into an 
aspiration to transform rather than simply preserve the existing system.”
53
 The EUGS thus puts a  
particular emphasis on the importance of strengthening international law and international institutions. 
The Strategy mentions specifically cyber, space, energy and health as fields for developing further a 
rules-based international system.
54
 
Against this background, the questions guiding the discussion of the second breakout session 
revolved around how the EU could better harness its strengths in bringing about tangible progress in 
building a rules-based global order. Developing norms for cyber space was selected as a focused 
case study. This was due, firstly, to the emphasis the EUGS accords to cyber norms and security.
55
 
Secondly, the Conclusions of the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council of 17 October 2016 also stressed the 
need to optimize “synergies and ensur[e] coherence between policy responses to challenges 
straddling the internal and external policies of the Union” and the need to focus on “hybrid threats.”
56
 
Thirdly, this choice was due to the trailblazing role the Netherlands has played in this area, as 
evidenced by its hosting of the 2015 Global Conference on CyberSpace in The Hague.  
In the discussion with the experts, it became apparent that many kinds of crime – and security threats 
more generally – have acquired an online dimension today. Considering also the economic importance 
of the digital revolution for the EU’s place in the world, cyber is a cross-cutting theme. 
In terms of creating norms for cyber governance, two main modes of norm creation can be 
distinguished. Each of them provides both challenges and opportunities for the EU as a shaper of 
global norms. Firstly, there is the traditional mode of creating international law through international 
agreements and working through international organizations. Examples in point here are the 2001 
Convention on Cybercrime (also known as the Budapest Convention) and the work of the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU). The other, novel mode is working through multistakeholder 
processes, i.e. informal, fluid settings involving non-state actors such as the business sector, the 
technical community and users.
57
 Examples for this include the governance of the Internet Corporation 
for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and the 2014 NetMundial Global Multistakeholder Meeting 
on the Future of Internet Governance. In the latter case, governments are still represented, for 
instance in ICANN’s Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC), but play a far less prominent role. By 
contrast, the private sector assumes a more (overtly) powerful position in multistakeholder settings. 
However, the lines between two models are blurry, as inter-governmental approaches can and do 
consult with non-state actors. Moreover, governments, including the Netherlands, openly support 
multistakeholder approaches, for instance through the Internet Governance Forum. 
In terms of challenges, at the moment neither mode of governance is able to forge a global consensus 
on an ambitious set of cyber norms. This means that many issues of policy, law and ethics remain to 
be sorted out by corporations by default. This led one expert to describe the current state of affairs as 
the “privatization of justice.” In addition, currently public opinion appears rather averse to new global 
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rules in general, heeding the experience the EU had with the ratification of the ill-fated Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) and the lack of public support for new trade agreements such 
as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).  
Moreover, the creation of norms and their universalization would mean little if not backed up by a 
strong European digital industrial base and implementation and enforcement capabilities. Due to the 
interconnected nature of the Internet, the weakest links can often be found in weak states outside of 
the EU, making a secure Internet also a matter of EU foreign policy.  
In terms of opportunities, given the Global Strategy’s conception of the EU’s role as “an agenda-
shaper, a connector, coordinator and facilitator within a networked web of players,”
58
 it is well-
equipped to play a much more active role in multistakeholder settings than it currently does. This does 
not equate replacing the Member States. Rather, it entails the EU investing in multistakeholder 
governance, showing more high-profile leadership in this area, and playing a constructive role in 
coordinating the Member States, including in the GAC, at the ITU and in the global promotion of the 
Budapest Convention, which is also open to non-European states. 
Moreover, even though the EU might not be perceived as a “cyber power” on the world stage, it has 
shown its potential to be innovative and work towards tangible benefits for its citizens. One high-profile 
example is in the area of data protection and privacy, as evidenced by the case law of the Court of 
Justice of the EU, which established a “right to be forgotten”
59
 and new legislation such as the General 
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).
60
 Through these measures, the EU has shown leadership in the 
application of fundamental rights in the digital age, which can serve as inspiration—or at least as a 
stimulus for debate—in the global marketplace of ideas. For this to happen, these internal 
developments must receive political follow-up, including by the external representatives of the EU and 
the Member States. This brings back the importance of strategic communication mentioned earlier, to 
the outside world, but also to EU citizens and consumers to help explain in which ways the EU is 
protecting individual rights. Moreover, considering norm advancement at the global level too 
ambitious, opting for regional approaches and coalitions of like-minded actors can respond to the 
public’s concerns. As a ‘second best option’, this may lead to fragmentation and to some extent a loss 
of effectiveness. But this can be seen as the price to be paid in order to move forward at all. 
Furthermore, the completion of the digital single market and flanking measures should strengthen 
Europe’s market power in this area. Regarding implementation and enforcement in particular, the EU 
needs to lead by example in order to be credible on the international stage. Hence, efforts must be 
made to further advance both digital rights and to harmonize criminal justice with a digital dimension 
within the EU. The latter can be achieved through stronger cooperation of law enforcement agencies, 
using more fully the potential of Europol and the European Union Agency for Network and Information 
Security (ENISA), which can also be seen as part of the EU positioning itself as a player in global 
cyber governance and security. Both in Europe and in third countries, especially in weak states, norm-
shaping needs to go hand-in-hand with capacity-building efforts. Consequently, a nexus exists 
between the EU’s development policy and cyber security. 
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Regarding the next steps for establishing policy-specific roadmaps for implementing the EUGS, the 
area of cyber can build on the 2013 Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union.
61
 As a first step, 
this document needs to be updated in light of the Global Strategy. Moreover, given the cross-cutting 
importance of cyber in today’s governance, both internal and external, cyber aspects should be 
mainstreamed into other sectoral strategies to be adopted with a view to the implementation of the 
EUGS. 
3.4 Strengthening the EU’s ‘joined-up’ approach in the implementation of 
the SDGs 
During the third breakout session, three interrelated aspects of the EUGS with regard to the SDGs 
were discussed: firstly, the level of reflection of the SDGs in the EUGS as the new cornerstone of 
global development policy; secondly, an assessment of the ‘joined-up approach’ and its implications 
for the SDGs; and, thirdly, the operationalization of the ambitions enshrined in the EUGS with regard 
to the SDGs and the way forward regarding implementation. The Global Strategy uses the SDGs as 
an example for the added-value of a more ‘joined-up Union,’ noting that the “SDGs also encourage us 
to expand and apply the principle of policy coherence for development to other policy areas, and 
encourage joint analysis and engagement across Commission services, institutions and Member 
States.”
62
 
Firstly, when assessing the place of the SDGs in the ambitions laid down in the EUGS as a whole, the 
experts affirmed that there is an apparent sense of friction between the support for the SDGs (and the 
civil society actors engaged in the pursuit of these goals) and the increased emphasis on the security 
sector. Even if it is only aimed at creating a degree of EU strategic autonomy from NATO, this 
nonetheless creates concerns that the CSDP will be prioritized in EU external action—over 
development and other policies in pursuit of the SDGs. There was a common understanding among 
the experts, however, that similarly to the SDGs, the EUGS is also the result of complex negotiations. 
One of the new elements, when compared to the 2003 European Security Strategy,
63
 is the EUGS’s 
less Eurocentric nature, which was highly welcomed by the experts. While Eurocentrism is not bad per 
se it is not helpful for engaging global civil society and for promoting universal values, thus rendering 
EU foreign policy less effective. This could become a credibility challenge for the Union. In the end, all 
these issues translate into an uneasy marriage of values and interests in the EUGS. The ‘principled 
pragmatism’ approach and the choice of terms such as ‘resilience’ and ‘flexibility’ is well founded in 
this regard and will hopefully prove useful when devising internal and external policies to overcome 
insecurity and uncertainty within Europe and beyond. 
Secondly, a ‘joined-up approach’ can facilitate joint actions at the sector level, and incorporate 
development initiatives and objectives, above all the SDGs, in the first stages of EU programming. In 
doing so the joined-up approach can close gaps and avoid overlaps in development cooperation in 
support of the SDGs, as well as improving the EU’s political visibility. However, experts warned that 
the priorities of the EUGS seem to be more aligned within the internal needs of the Union and that the 
SDGs are not at the center of the EUGS. Therefore, there is an apparent discrepancy between internal 
and external approaches, and as a result SDGs are not always strongly translated in the EUGS. 
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Migration is a case in point, being regarded rather as a security concern. Unfortunately, the positive 
aspects of migration that could be used as a way of promoting sustainable development seem largely 
absent from the EUGS and the surrounding discourse. But experts agreed that the EUGS is a 
balancing exercise of prioritizing objectives and challenges of the EU, as opposed to the SDGs which 
are a global commitment.   
A joined-up approach aims at greater efficiency and lower transaction costs for partner countries. In 
the short term this means more coordination on the side of the Member States and EU delegations. 
However, the concept remains very broad and needs more substance and strengthening, particularly 
when creating more connectivity and unity within the EU and in its message abroad. There is a need 
to focus more on the implementation of already existing policies related to SDGs within the EU for 
which the EU must lead by example. The fact that this is mentioned in the EUGS was welcomed by 
the experts.
64
 In the end, even if overoptimistic, the EUGS remains a good reference point for future 
policies and can be used to hold EU institutions and Member State governments accountable. 
The main issues regarding the implementation of the EUGS and the way forward remain the political 
will and the financial means. The wide-ranging SDGs are not easily or always translated into the 
EUGS, and this will make it difficult for their implementation and credibility. While acknowledging the 
limitations of the EUGS, in that is a non-legally binding document with generic objectives, an issue of 
concern is the lack of vision on operationalization of the SDGs and the means and human resources 
to do it. Fourteen years remain to achieve the SDGs, therefore the political will to achieve unity 
internally and the financial means to push the message across and promote change externally will be 
no small task. Strategic investment should aim at integrating the SDGs and the financial tools to 
implement these goals should be better specified in follow-up documents. The Global Strategy 
emphasizes that “implementing the SDGs will require change across all internal and external policies, 
galvanizing public-private partnerships, and leveraging the experience of the European Investment 
Bank (EIB) in providing technical assistance and building capacities in developing and middle income 
countries.”
65
 It remains unclear how this will be achieved in practice. Therefore, developing more 
specific cross-cutting sub-strategies at the sectoral level will be crucial.  
Moreover, communication will be a serious challenge. The EU should take, and is already taking to 
some extent, a leading role in coordinating the efforts to communicate to the European public how the 
Strategy translates into the daily life of Europeans when it comes to sustainable development. This will 
be critical to get the requisite public support. The EUGS highlights that “while a prosperous Union is 
the basis for a stronger Europe in the world, prosperity must be shared and requires fulfilling the 
Sustainable Development Goals worldwide, including in Europe.”
66
 This focus on prosperity can lead 
the way to incorporating the language of the SDGs in subsequent implementation policies of the 
EUGS. 
The main conclusion drawn from this session was that one of the principal strengths of the EUGS is in 
fact its broadness and openness while highlighting core concepts of global development. Hence, it can 
be used for advocacy and hold governments accountable. However, this is also its weakness, since its 
vague language can be used by states to be very selective in its interpretation, depending on their 
needs. Therefore, tensions between the internal challenges (lack of unity), and external challenges 
(effectiveness of EU external action) remain, and they mutually affect each other. Moreover, 
increasing internal divisions will render difficult the implementation of EU policies related to SDGs 
abroad as well. Implementation will be possible if the SDGs are translated into measurable goals. 
Efforts should be focused on implementing already existing policies and strategies regarding the 
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SDGs, and in taking them into account when devising new ones. The joined-up approach is highly 
welcomed particularly in the fields of climate diplomacy, energy diplomacy, economic diplomacy and 
cultural diplomacy, as highlighted also in the Council Conclusions of 17 October.
67
 However, the 
limited human resources and financial means need to be wisely used.  
Coherent communication and co-ownership with Member States will remain vital if the SDGs are to be 
progressively realized through joined-up EU external action as guided by the EUGS. Agreeing on a 
common language and message is critical to incorporate the SDGs in the implementation of the 
EUGS. The most important next step is to translate the EUGS into prioritized and coherent sub-
strategies at the EU and member state level in a coordinated manner, acknowledging consistently the 
importance of the SDGs as a global commitment. In this sense, the Council Conclusions, which 
declared in relation to the implementation of the EUGS that the “sustainable development goals will be 
a crosscutting dimension of all this work,”
68
 show that the EU is going in the right direction.   
4. Conclusion and Recommendations 
The preceding reflections on the content, reception and implementation of the Global Strategy, 
drawing on the discussions at the expert meetings convened by The Hague Institute in December 
2015 and by The Hague Institute and Europe House in September 2016 can be summarized in the 
following main points. Firstly, a wide range of ideas, put forward during the expert consultation of 
December 2015, were reflected in the EUGS. These include the acknowledgement of civil society as a 
key partner for the EU, the EU’s role in developing norms in new areas of global governance in order 
to construct a rules-based global order, and the EU’s role as a connector, coordinator and agenda-
setter. 
Secondly, with regard to the expert sessions of 30 September 2016, the following main findings and 
recommendations with a view to implementing the EUGS stand out. The current European security 
and geopolitical situation require pragmatic solutions to solve urgent crises. Both capacity and the 
necessary institutional mechanisms and policies already exist, but political will is lacking—especially in 
the capitals. The experts strongly believe in NATO-EU cooperation, especially with the possibility of a 
British exit from the EU and hence from the CFSP/CSDP over the next few years. Furthermore, they 
advised to include the private sector and civil society in defense cooperation to address future 
challenges (e.g. in the areas of cyber and space). Recommendations in this area include: 
 The EU needs a pragmatic and flexible approach in order to solve the crises facing and 
surrounding Europe and to improve its credibility in the short and long term, for example, by 
using ad hoc coalitions. 
 A possible Brexit could open up political space for deepened defense cooperation. To achieve 
this, the EU would need to find ways to make use of this political space in order to generate 
political will in the capitals. 
 The EU should devise plans to connect with its citizens as a security actor and communicate 
the message that EU defense cooperation tangibly benefits the security of all citizens. 
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In terms of implementing the Global Strategy’s ambition for the EU to develop norms “at the frontiers 
of global affairs,” the area of cyber governance is of cross-cutting importance for both the Union’s  
economy and security. Recommendations in this area include: 
 The EU should fully embrace the role of agenda-shaper, connector, coordinator and facilitator 
within a networked web of players in cyber governance by investing in multistakeholder 
initiatives and together with the Member States showing coordinated political leadership in this 
area. 
 The EU needs to take its internal normative innovations (such as the “right to be forgotten”) to 
the global stage, where they can serve as inspiration to other actors and stimulate 
discussions, and use regional approaches and coalitions of like-minded countries as building 
blocks for working towards a global consensus. 
 The EU should bolster its credibility as a cyber power by capacity-building both within the EU 
and the Member States and by supporting third countries, especially weak states, to fight 
criminal activities and strengthen cooperation between law enforcement agencies. 
Concerning the EU’s joined-up approach and the pursuit of the SDGs, it was found that there is friction 
between support towards SDGs and an increased emphasis on security. The main challenge is to 
tackle the mismatch between what is already being done and what is proposed in the EUGS. 
Additionally, the joined-up approach is seen as very broad and needs more substance and 
strengthening, in particular to create more connectivity and unity within the EU. Finally, the main 
issues regarding the implementation of the EUGS and the way forward remain political will and 
financial means. The recommendations in this area include: 
 The progressive realization of the SDGs through ‘joined-up’ EU action needs to be translated 
and concretized into measurable goals. This should be pursued through already existing 
policies and strategies and be taken into account in new ones. 
 The EU should invest in communicating to the public, in tandem with the Member States, that 
the SDGs are a global commitment with implications, both positive and negative, in the daily 
lives of citizens. 
 For the EU, the most important next step is to translate the EUGS into prioritized and coherent 
sub-strategies with a view to maintaining the SDGs as a central element of the follow-up of the 
EUGS. 
As the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council noted in its Conclusions of 17 October 2016, the Global Strategy 
“will guide the EU’s external action for the years to come.”
69
 First steps have already been taken by 
the Council in November 2016 in one of the three focus areas of this report in the form of an 
Implementation Plan on Security and Defence.
70
 The calendars of the EU institutions and Member 
State policymakers continue to fill up with further milestones for its implementation. Existing sector-
specific strategies will be updated and new ones developed. In June 2017, the High Representative 
will submit the first yearly implementation report of the EUGS to the Council. This will be a crucial 
moment to gauge whether the words of the Strategy have been followed by deeds. Implementing the 
Global Strategy is a momentous endeavor by any standard, both for the EU and its Member States. 
How well they will work together, use their resources, build political momentum and voice their 
common message will ultimately determine whether it will be a Herculean or a Sisyphean task. 
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